Abstract
Introduction
The commercial introduction of broadband wireless communication technology such as UMTS or WiMAX facilitates the connection of vehicles with the Internet and hence with a broad range of service providers. However, since message exchange between vehicles is based on vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), V2V interaction is subject to large network effects. On-vehicle electronic systems are also facing many threats, such as Trojans, and viruses. The data security of vehicles has been widely concerned among researchers.
The new rising trusted computing technology uses TPM (Trusted Platform Module) [1] with lower cost to bring trusted root into every type of computer platform and to provide secure computing environment to applications. TCG (Trusted Computing Group) [2] organization distributed a series of standards, which define the functions provided by TPM, e.g., platform configuration verification, memory protection, and outside authentication. China also issues own TCM (Trusted Cryptography Module) [3] , which can be widely used in army, public security, and so on.
This study applies the trusted computing technology into the vehicle terminals of Internet of vehicles, proposes a new approach to protect the integrality and privacy of vehicular information based on TCM, and discuss how to use trusted computing technology to realize the secure communication among vehicles. Our main contributions are summarized as: 1) the trusted computing technology and its feasibility applied in VANETs is studied; 2) the concept of a trusted vehicular platform is introduced.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the related work. Section 3 then introduces trusted computing technology, followed by an introduction about security functions of trusted vehicular platform based on TCM in Section 4. In Section 5 we provide experiments. Finally, the work is concluded in Section 6.
Related work
Sensors and embedded systems already play a large role in the automotive industry. These will become even more important when these are integrated into a future "Internet of Vehicles". In case the vehicles are wireless enabled, they may autonomously connect to each other and exchange information. However, the wide use of on-vehicle computers and software is opening up the possibility of unauthorized access, information leak, and even worm attacks. An attack on vehicle may interfere with critical applications such as engine control and safety warning systems hence resulting in serious congestion on the roads and even large-scale accidents. Hence, we propose a trusted vehicular platform and authentication model to solve the following three problems: 1) how to protect the integrality and credibility of the vehicle terminal system; 2) how to protect the privacy of user data and integrality of keys.
Recently there have been many studies on structures, protocols and algorithms of trusted network. Zhang et al. [4] addressed a cooperation enforcement mechanism based on a node trust model in order to evaluate the trustworthiness of neighboring nodes. Gasmi et al. [5] described secure and flexible mechanisms to establish and maintain trusted channels and also presented a concrete implementation proposal based on transport layer security protocol. Chen et al. [6] put forward a new information measurement architecture, where not only the integrality information of the platform, but also the identity of user and platform, and the information of system availability are considered. Schellekens et al. [7] presented a mixed solution by using the trusted computing hardware and timing based on remote code integrality verification mechanism. The above works mainly considered information measurement and verification for a trusted network, which are different from our work. Vasiliadis et al. [8] analyzed a network model in the context of providing trusted information a central database and one or more servers in the network based on lightweight directory access protocol. Kuntze et al. [9] described a concept to employ trusted computing technology to secure conditional access systems for digital video broadcasting. Hassan et al. [10] advised to exploit the trust between the owners of neighboring access points for reducing the authentication delay in wireless networks. Chen et al. [11] explored and developed a mathematical framework of trust in cognitive radio network, to further develop trusted routing with relevant explorations on network layer and above functions. Schmidt et al. [12] proposed a concept for authorization using the location of a mobile device and the enforcement of location-based policies, and the mobile devices enhanced by trusted computing capabilities operate an autonomous and secure location trigger and policy enforcement entity. Schmidt et al. [13] also proposed an approach for the practical design and implementation of a trusted mobile platform and how to deploy it to a trustworthy operating platform.
Partly inspired and influenced by the works above, we use trusted computing technology to construct a trusted vehicular platform, in which the integrality measurement, integrality report, and protected storage are integrated to solve the security threats of Internet of vehicles.
Trusted Cryptography Module (TCM)
We use TCM as choice of trusted computing technology. The most important part of TCM is Cryptographic Support Platform for Trusted Computing (CSPTC), which is composed of TCM and TSM (TCM Service Module), as shown in Fig. 1 . TCM, as the key part of trusted computing technology provides independent cryptogram algorithms. TCM defines a subsystem including memory protection and execution protection function, which builds trust root for computing system and whose isolated computing resources are protected strictly. Fig. 2 illustrates the structure of TCM. The functions of every module are as follows: 1) I/O: input and output interfaces of TCM. It is responsible for the communications between all modules and other interfaces and applications. 2) SMS4 engine: execution unit of SMS4 symmetric cryptography. 3) SM2 engine: generate SM2 key pair, and perform the SM2 encryption, decryption and signature operations. 4) SM3 engine: hash computing unit. 5) Random number generator: generate random numbers. 6) HMAC engine: SM3-based message authentication code calculation unit. 7) Execution engine: operational execution unit of TCM. 8) Non-Volatile Storage: permanent storage unit. 9) Volatile Storage: run-time temporary storage unit. TSM mainly provides supports for basis resource to TCM, e.g., give application programs an entry point to call TCM security protection function, provide synchronous access to TCM, and hide commands of TCM from application programs and manage resources of TCM. The structure of TSM is shown in Fig. 3 . The structure of TSM is divided into core layer, the system service layer and the user program layer. The kernel software of core layer is TDD (TCM Device Driver) which is a software module to directly drive TCM. The kernel software of the system service layer is TDDL (TCM Device Driver Library) and TCS (TCM Core Services). TDDL provides a standard interface to transmit instructions and status information between user mode and kernel-mode. TCS is in the form of system services and provide TCM use and key management function interface for top applications such as TSP. The kernel software of the user program layer is TSP (TCM Service Provider). TSP provides TCM services to applications. Applications can easily use TCM through TSP. CSPTC uses cryptography to ensure platform integrality via integrality measurement, store and report of system components. The measuring value of computing component is written into the corresponding PCR (Platform Configuration Register) of TCM. In addition, CSPTC uses EK (Endorsement Key) to denote identity, and generate a key pair called PIK (Platform Identity Key) inside TCM under permission of platform owner to sign digital certification on information inside TCM and to realize the platform identity authentication and the platform integrality report, and to verify the trustiness of information inside platform for outside entities. The managing operations of key, e.g. generating, loading and revoking, are beyond the discussion in this paper, and the related contents can be found in [3] .
The general process of platform integrality verification is described as follows:
Step 1. The outside entity (e.g. leader of tank group) sends request for integrality measurement to CSPTC after CSPTC begins;
Step 2. TCM collects PCR values and signs PCR values with PIK;
Step 3. CSPTC sends the PCR values, the signature of PIK on PCR values and the PIK certification to outside entity;
Step 4. The outside entity receives the PCR values, the signature of PIK on PCR values and the PIK certification from CSPTC;
Step 5. The outside entity verifies the PIK certification;
Step 6. The outside entity verifies the signature of PCR values;
Step 7. The outside entity compares the PCR values with the baseline value of platform integrality. If the result is the same, the current state of platform is trust.
Trusted Vehicular Platform
TCM is the core component of trusted vehicular platform. TCM can establish a trust root for measurement, a trust root for storage, and another one trust root for report in the vehicle terminal. TCM can provide security functions for the vehicular platform such as integrality measure, storage, and report, and thus the vehicular platform ensures the security of data and the authenticity of identity.
1. Trust chain
Trusted vehicular platform builds a trusted chain to protect its integrality. Building the trusted chain starts at the root of trust measurement. First of all, the trust root for measurement measures the integrality of BIOS Boot Block, POST BIOS and other components of vehicular embedded system, stores the measured value into the PCR inside the TCM and judges the integrality of BIOS according to the selected mechanism. If the integrality is not damaged, then runs BIOS and continues to measure the integrality of IPL/MBR. Judge the integrality of IPL and MBR according to the selected mechanism. If the integrality of IPL and MBR is not damaged, then run the MBR. Then IPL/MBR measures the integrality of OS kernel. If the integrality of this component is not damaged, this component measures the integrality of OS kernel. If the integrality of OS kernel is not damaged, then run the OS kernel. Detect the integrality of OS services based on the same mechanism after running the OS kernel. It is necessary to ensure the reliability of the vehicle system in the boot process through transferring the trust relationships. Set a platform protection module when vehicle electronic systems run. Platform protection module is used to measure the integrality of the application or process and ensure the application or process trusted. The process of building trusted chain is shown in 
2. Integrality report and identity
Before carrying on the sensitive information communication, the vehicle platform should be able to identify it and to verify the current condition credibility to the exterior entity. Trusted vehicular platform uses EK to mark identity. EK is the only and must be preserved within the TCM. EK shall not be exported outside TCM. Under the authority of the owner of the vehicle platform, the TCM inside generates a key pair SM2 as a PIK, and further can produce multiple PIKs, every PIK is bounded with the EK for digital signature information inside the TCM. A PIK represents platform identity, achieves platform authentication and the report of platform integrality, which confirms that the data is trusted within the platform to external entities.
3. Trusted storage
TCM is the trust root for storage, achieves key management functions, provides the appropriate cryptography service and protects the private information of owner and user (such as authentication key) or sensitive data effectively against the leak or tamper with.
Vehicle platform data protection: protect and store data of vehicle platform through data encryption/decryption, data seal, digital envelope and other security functions of TCM. where SM2 algorithm uses a fixed Fp, the key length is m(m=256), C1 is the string of bytes representing a point on the curve E(Fp), C2 is a byte string whose length is the same to M, and C3 is the length of m/8 bytes string.
2) Data seal bounds data to the specific vehicle platform state (PCR value) and the TCM. Data seal uses the symmetric cipher algorithm, and it is expressed as:
sealed Data = SMS4_Encrypt (key, (data || PCRValue || TCM_Proof )); Data seal uses the elliptic curve cryptography, and it is expressed as: sealed Data = SM2_Encrypt (SM2PUBKEY, (data || PCRValue || TCM_Proof )) where TCM_Proof is the unique identification of the TCM.
3) Digital envelope uses the symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt and protect data, while uses elliptic curve cryptography algorithms to encrypt and protect key in symmetric cryptographic algorithm. The specific process is as follows: a) Randomly generate a symmetric encryption key: symmetric key. b) Symmetric encryption key and symmetric encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the data. c) encData = SMS4_Encrypt (symmetric Key, data); d) Use SM2 public key and SM2 encryption algorithm to encrypt the symmetric key. encSymmetricKey = SM2_Encrypt (PUBKEY, symmetric Key); e) Inside the TCM, SM2 private key and SM2 decryption algorithm are used to decrypt the symmetric key. Then the symmetric key is used to decrypt the data within the platform.
Vehicle platform key protection: TCM achieves the safe storage of keys based on encryption in the form of the key tree. According to the use of keys, the key in the vehicle platform is divided into three categories: a) Platform identity type key, including EK, PIK, and Platform Encryption Key (PEK). b) Platform storage type key, including Storage Master Key (SMK). c) User type key User Key (UK).
TCM has high security, and the TCM internal storage space is limited, so only the cryptography module key and SMK are stored in the trusted cryptography modules directly within the physical security protection through the TCM. SMK is at the top of the key tree. PIK, PEK, UK, and others are encrypted and protected by SMK and stored in the TCM outside. These keys are at the lower level and achieve platform authentication, key transmission, user data encryption, and others. Key hierarchy of protected storage can greatly increase the vehicle platform information and data security.
Experiments
In our earlier work [14] , we proposed a hierarchy trusted access model compatible with Trusted Network Connect (TNC), and we use this as the vehicular access model in the simulations. All vehicle terminals are equipped with JT3210 TCM development board (as shown in Fig. 5 ) and ASUS P5QSE motherboard (with TCM Physical interface).
Figure 5. TCM development board
In the experiments, TCM chip in vehicle terminal calls TSP interface function to measure operation system version, operation system patch version, IE version, IE file, and operation system file, and then extends the measure values to PCR16-20. The hash algorithm uses SM3 algorithm. The length of hash value is 256 after calculating. An example of the hash values of PCR are listed in Table 1 (in hex). Through comparing the collected trusted attributes with the integrality reference values, the decision maker can decide whether or not allow the terminal to access. In the trusted assessment process, the average time to calculate trusted attributes values and store them to PCR (CT), the average time to transfer them to decision maker (DT), and the average time to return results (LT) are listed in Table 2 . 
Conclusion
To solve many information security problems of vehicle terminals in the Internet of vehicles, we propose to apply TCM into the vehicular electronic systems and protect vehicular information, data privacy and security from attacks. With wireless communication increases in the Internet of vehicles, we also design a network access authentication model and verify it by developing a prototype system. This scheme improves network security and management, provides supports for the reliable communications among vehicles in the Internet of vehicles, and has a good application prospect.
